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Impact of TRIPS and RTAs on the Indian Pharmaceutical Product Exports 
 
Bishwanjit Loitongbam
 
Abstract:  Until India fully implemented TRIPS in 2005, the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry had maintained a comparative advantage of cheap and skilled workers among 
developing economies. However, recent changes in regulatory environment have made the 
situation challenging for the industry. India seems to be losing its position in the global arena in 
both the production of bulk drugs and formulations. This paper investigates how TRIPS 
(implemented by partner countries) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) influence Indian 
pharmaceutical product exports, using the Gravity Model. This analysis finds that TRIPS has 
negative effect on Indian pharmaceutical products exports. And RTAs increase pharmaceutical 
products exports.  
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1. Introduction: 
The Indian pharmaceutical industry (IPI) is the leading supplier of cheap generic drugs in 
the world. The spectacular growth in this sector is mainly due to various legislative reforms of 
the Indian government to protect its domestic pharmaceutical industry and diminish foreign 
dominance, and other changes including reverse engineering of patented drug molecules, and the 
implementation of the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Since India’s 
implementation of TRIPS, in compliance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, 
there has been significant change in the policy, growth and development of the IPI. Due to this 
new policy regime, India could not produce drugs patented by the foreign companies through 
reverse-engineering. Surprisingly, in spite of the very notion that a strong intellectual property 
rights would lead to higher drugs’ prices and may hamper their domestic, infant, high 
technological industry like pharmaceutical industry in the less developed countries, India has 
witnessed a surge in production in the post TRIPS period.  The increased number of product 
registrations in both regulated and emerging markets is the driving force of this growth.  India is 
also converging and thereby reaping the advantages of its underdeveloped state. In general, after 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), implementation of TRIPS has been progressing and thereby countries are agreeing to 
enforce their domestic laws and regulations designed for the protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs).  But IPRs are highly contentious in international relations. Developing economies 
believe that the stronger IPRs only benefit the developed countries at the expense of developing 
countries which strengthen the monopoly of big companies based in industrial countries.  Still, 
implementation of TRIPS is very crucial in knowledge intensive industries like the 
pharmaceutical industry. Since the world pharmaceutical industry has had relatively significant 
growth during the last several decades, the role of developing countries in the pharmaceutical 
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global value chains (GVCs) is growing. According to IMS Health reports, medication use around 
the world will reach 4.5 trillion doses by 2020 with over half of the world’s population taking 
one medicine a day, up from one third in 2005.  Almost half of the projected growth will be 
contributed by just four major emerging economies which include India, China, Brazil and 
Indonesia.  Access to healthcare in these countries has also increased significantly.  With the 
increase in access to medicines worldwide, global spending on drugs is expected to rise by 30 
percent to $1.4 trillion.  Developed countries still contribute the lion’s share of this spending 
growth on drugs.  Even though the purchasing power of people in the emerging economies has 
increased, they can only buy low-cost medications.  Sales of generic drugs account for 88 
percent of total medications bought, whereas sales of newer, specialty medications that target 
chronic, rare or genetic disease like cancer, hepatitis C, and autoimmune diseases account for 
only 1% of the total in these countries
1
. 
The case of India is interesting because India has implemented TRIPS in compliance with 
the WTO accession in 1995.  The Indian Patent Act 1970 has been amended three times; once in 
March 1999, again in June 2002, and the third having come in April 2005 (Jha, 2007). India has 
undertaken many industrial and trade reforms, such as lowering tariffs levels and eliminating or 
decreasing non-tariff barriers, etc.  R&D expenditures, by the domestic and foreign 
pharmaceutical companies, merger and acquisitions (M&A), and patent activity and patent 
filings by Indian pharmaceutical firms, have significantly increased. The consumption of 
medications in India is increasing due to the increase in basic healthcare infrastructure and ease 
of access. The growth of exports has also increased dramatically.  The main reason for this 
                                                          
1
How India, the World’s Pharmacy, Is Becoming More Medicated, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/11/19/how-india-the-worlds-pharmacy-is-
becoming-more-medicated/ 
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growth has to do with the generic markets, particularly within the regulated market which has 
shifted from the export of bulk drugs to formulations which implies that bulk drugs exports don’t 
enjoy a comparative trade advantage any longer.   
Pharmaceutical industry sector being a knowledge-based sector have been an important 
sector both in the developed and developing countries, including India. In amidst of the rapid 
globalization process, India shifted its pharmaceuticals trade pattern and faced a tough 
competition in the global pharmaceutical markets, particularly from developing countries. Thus, 
it is immensely important to analyze the issue of global competitiveness of India in the world 
pharmaceutical market. We would like to examine how India achieves such a rapid rise in 
pharmaceuticals exports in the world. To estimate the determinant of trade, we use the gravity 
model. It explains (the natural logarithm of) trade with (the logs of) the distance between 
countries and their joint income. We, then, try to investigate the effect of TRIPS implementation, 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and tariff (proxy for trade openness) on the Indian 
pharmaceutical exports. We extended the basic gravity equation with a number of extra 
conditioning variables such as common language, health expenditure and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The study finds that the effect of partner countries’ TRIPS implementation is 
negative and significant on the IPI. It implies that India is shifting its pharmaceutical exports 
from regulated markets to unregulated markets. TRIPS implementation has greater impact on 
formulations exports than that on bulk exports. The RTAs have increased the export performance 
of India. It benefits more on formulations exports than bulk exports. 
This paper is arranged as follows. Section II gives literature review. Section III shows 
data and methodology for the study of impact of globalization on the IPI through WTO accession 
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and the integration of global value chains, and its patterns of trade. Finally, Section IV 
summarizes the results and concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEWS: 
By protecting IPR, TRIPS allow technology transfer and diffusion, and relate to a set of 
administrative and market-organizing regulated rules. They enable agents to use or transfer 
resources among each other, and allow governments to achieve economic efficiency which is one 
goal observed in IPR regulations, or product liability and safety regulations. In the context of IPI, 
after the implementation of TRIPS, there is a major change in the IPI in terms of output, 
productivity, R&D, technological capabilities, etc. at industry level and at firm level. The 
implementation of TRIPS has increased the patenting activity and R&D investment of the Indian 
pharmaceutical companies (Chaudhuri, 2007; Chadha, 2009; Bedi, et al., 2013) and increased 
sales and export performances of the companies (Kiran and Mishra, 2009a). This finding is in 
line with that of Guennif & Ramani (2012), that the IPI had had more success in industrial 
capabilities than that of Brazil due to State policy after the IPR reform. Fink (2000) examined the 
effects of the introduction of product patent protection on the two therapeutic groups in the IPI. 
He found that the impact of patent protection on Indian pharmaceutical products depended on the 
values of the assumed elasticities. Possibility of increase in prices and welfare losses will be 
minimized if close and off-patent substitute drugs are available and vice versa. Watal (2000) also 
examined the effects of patent protection in 22 patentable pharmaceutical markets and found that 
prices and welfare losses are likely to increase in moving from current market structures to 
patent monopoly depending on the demand structure. TRIPS implementation raised drug’s prices 
and decreased technological activities and exports in the IPI. Thus, stronger patent protection 
leads to higher drug prices and welfare losses in developing economies. 
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Examining the effects of product patent in India and China, Grace (2004) found that 
product patent limited profit earnings from the sales of drugs domestically and India increased its 
exports to regulated markets to compensate this revenue loss. This finding is confirmed by Jha, 
(2007). With the new patent policies, Indian pharmaceutical companies had shifted its business 
from domestic markets to regulated markets and had become net exporters of pharmaceuticals 
and import dependence on bulk drugs (Jha, 2007). It indicates that India focuses mainly on 
regulated markets. Besides TRIPS implementation has a significant effect on the firms’ patenting 
activity in India. Patent applications by the Indian companies increased more than proportional to 
patents granted over time, suggesting   technology transfer to India. This decrease of the granting 
ratio might be caused by strict regulations of the TRIPS. Kiran and Mishra (2009a) confirmed 
these findings that TRIPS implementation led to increase sales, exports, profits, R&D 
expenditures, patents filling and granting by the Indian pharmaceutical firms. But it reduced the 
availability of affordable drugs in developing countries (Hafner and Popp, 2011) as these 
countries could not do reverse-engineering of patented drugs. They also examined the role of 
India and China as suppliers of cheap medicines to other developing countries and the 
competitive effect of drug imports from these two countries on the price of drugs imported from 
high-income countries. They found that Latin America relies totally on intraregional trade and 
imports from the US, while Sub-Saharan Africa depends on India accounting for 45% of its 
imports. TRIPS implementation led Latin America to invoke compulsory licensing and negotiate 
cheaper drug prices. It also reduced drug imports and the availability of affordable drugs. For 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it might not have direct effects on drug prices as most countries have to 
implement TRIPS by 2016. They further showed that TRIPS implementation reduced the 
availability of affordable drugs both from India and high-income countries due to reduced 
competition. 
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Analyzing the effects of strengthening patent protection on income redistribution and 
deadweight loss between countries, McCalman (2001) found that developed countries especially 
the US significantly benefited from strengthening patent protection, while developing countries 
significantly lost from it. Accounting for the increase in dead weight loss from higher standards 
of patent protection undermined the aggregate benefits of the Uruguay Round package, with the 
increase in dead weight loss amounting to as much as one fifth of the efficiency gains from trade 
liberalization. As far as Indian consumer welfare is concerned, Chaudhuri, et al., (2006) found 
that the implementation of TRIPS results to some welfare loss, which includes the loss of 
product variety, price increase, etc. For example, they estimated the welfare loss for the 
quinolone sub-segment of the systematic anti-bacterial segment and found that the loss is 
between $144 million and $ 450 million per year, depending on the policies implemented. But 
they concluded that TRIPS would not have much detrimental effect on the IPI, as it increases 
domestic firms’ profits. In an attempt to find out the impact of TRIPS on innovation and on 
export using export data, Bouet (2015) found that TRIPS helped the Indian pharmaceutical firms 
to improve productive capabilities, by increasing the export of high-value added products and it 
enabled this industry to enter new markets with new trade flows .i.e. innovation. However, the 
impact of TRIPS on the value of exports is found to be insignificant. 
Most of these literatures about the IPI have been documented on the impact of the trade 
liberalization and the change in the Patent regime on the performance of the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector on industry performance. This issue involves a cross‐country analysis of 
the growth, productivity, trade performance and technology with other countries in the global 
market. Our analysis is concordant to these recent contributions, and adds to the literature on the 
influence of TRIPS implementation on the IPI by testing the hypothesis that the significance of 
TRIPS and RTAs are related to the persistence and the intensity of India’s total pharmaceutical 
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exports as well as both for bulk drugs and formulations exports. It is quite necessary to examine 
how TRIPs implemented by trading partners and RTAs affect Indian pharmaceutical product 
exports in the light of the rapid globalization process. Before going forward to empirically 
examine all these analyses, it is quite necessary to examine the basic characteristics and 
development of this industry. 
3. Data and Measures 
Trade factors such as transport costs and trade costs affect firms’ strategic decision as 
well as the decision to enter a new market. Distance can affect Indian pharmaceutical exports’ 
competitiveness as it involves transaction costs. To examine whether changes in trade costs favor 
proximate countries for Indian pharmaceutical exports, we look at changes in simple average 
tariffs and changes in transport costs. Indian exports of pharmaceutical products also depend on 
the foreign domestic demand for Indian pharmaceutical products which is represented by both 
the size and the characteristic of the demand to the industry’s product. Partners’ GDP and health 
expenditures are variables which represents foreign domestic demand for pharmaceutical 
products. 
The dependent variable is export of pharmaceuticals from India (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡) to a country ‘j’ for 
a product ‘k’ on a given year ‘t’ (‘t’ years, ‘t’= 1993 to 2013; ‘j’ destinations; ‘j’= 1 to 99 
countries; ‘k’ products = 1 to 45 – HS Combined 6 digits nomenclature. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  can be 
decomposed into total formulations exports and total bulk drugs exports from country ‘i’ to 
partner country ‘j’ in time ‘t’ for a product ‘k’. The paper used export data from the UN 
COMTRADE for cross-country analysis and is based on HS 1992 for 1993 to 1998, HS 1996 for 
1999 to 2002, HS 2002 for 2003 to 2008 and HS 2007 for 2009 to 2013. The pharmaceutical 
products are classified into bulk drugs and formulations and we use to classify it by using 6-
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digits, combined HS concordances and BEC concordance. The survey covers 6-digit combined 
HS codes: 63 bulk drugs codes and 14 formulations codes. We restricted the sample to countries 
whose bilateral export values exceeds $1 million in 2013, except for countries that signed FTAs 
with India, which accounts for 99 country units. The largest destination is the US. The exports 
value is measured in US dollar. The regressions use panel data for the years 1993 to 2013.  
The key independent variables in the paper are partner’s compliance of TRIPS (TRIPSjt), 
and RTAs between India and importing countries (RTAijt). The first one is central interest to our 
analysis for it will allow the analysis of export flow of Indian pharmaceuticals between regulated 
markets (TRIPS compliant) and unregulated markets. Thus it enables us to differentiate between 
the regulated markets and unregulated markets. TRIPS is a dummy variable which takes the 1 
value if the importing country ‘j’ implemented TRIPS for the year ‘t’ and 0 if not. RTAijt 
represents the combination of free trade agreements (FTAs) and preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) between the host country ‘i' and the destination country ‘j’ in time ‘t’. India signs FTAs 
with 15 countries. This study includes 20 countries, out of these 14 FTAs countries (excluded 
Brunei as some of the basic indicators are not available for this country) and 6 PTAs countries. 
However, other factors may impact the export of Indian pharmaceuticals. 
 In order to get unbiased estimated coefficients of the key independent variables, it is 
necessary to control for other factors that could also affects the export of pharmaceuticals. The 
other corresponding independent variables are tariff, WTO membership, distance, destination 
GDP, language and health expenditure which is the total health expenditure. Tariffjpt applied by 
the importing countries ‘j’ for product ‘k’on year ‘t’ affects the export flow. Distance (Distij) is 
the log geographical distance between country ‘i’ and country ‘j’ in kilometer. Distance may 
affect export for it impacts the products’ transaction costs. The log GDP of the partner country ‘j’ 
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for a given year ‘t’ (𝑌𝑗𝑡)represents the demand conditions in the partner countries ‘j’ on year ‘t’. 
The values are in $ millions of constant 2005 internationals USD.  The health expenditure, 
Healthjt, of partner country ‘j’ for a given year ‘t’ indicates the demand conditions of the partner 
country ‘j’ in time ‘t’. It is expressed as the total health expenditure (% GDP) of importing 
country ‘j’ in time ‘t’. Language is a dummy variable which is 1 if both the country shares a 
common English language and zero otherwise. We include language as language barriers inhibit 
bilateral trade as it associate costs while communication. 
The paper used data from WTO database to create an indicator of FTAs and Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, Government of India for PTAs.  The standard gravity variables of 
destination GDP which measures the size, health expenditure, come from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI) database.  However, since the Myanmar’s GDP is not 
available at the WDI database, we use this country’s GDP from IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
Database. Distance between capital cities and linguistic, are taken from Rose’s 2004 website. 
TRIPS compliance data comes from (Kyle and McGahan, 2012). Average tariffs are the 
(unweighted) average tariffs from World Integrated Trade System. FDI data is taken from the 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) database. 
4.3.2. Gravity Model 
To organize our empirical analysis of globalization and its impact on Indian 
pharmaceutical exports, we rely on the Gravity model. As the name suggests, the idea behind the 
model comes from the law of universal gravitation and is a widely used tool to understand 
bilateral trade flows in international economics. The most robust empirical result in international 
economics is that bilateral trade decreases with distance (Melitz, 2007; Disdier, et al., 
2008).Trade flows are positively related to the size of the trading partners and inversely related 
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to the distance between them. It is used to explain bilateral trade flows, and dates back to 
(Tinbergen, 1962) and (Pöyhönen, 1963). Anderson, (1979) and Anderson and Wincoop, (2003) 
provide theoretical foundations for the gravity model. Anderson, (2011) examines the exporting 
country’s average exporting capability in the industry. Lawless (2010) empirically examined that 
trade cost barriers work more through the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin (also; 
Hanson, et al., 2014). Rose, (2004) and Feenstra et al., (1998), empirically examined the effect of 
multilateral trade agreement on international trade using gravity model.  
Since the study uses a panel data with a time dimension, we use ‘t’ subscripts to signify 
variables that change over time. In a typical gravity equation, it is usual to have data on many 
different pairs of trading partners and include both exporter and importer income in the 
regression. But, since our data are for a single exporting country (i.e. India), exporter income is 
captured in the regression constant, and partners’ income is included in the regression. 
The exact specification of the gravity model will then be: 
Ln (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑝𝑡 +
                         𝛽6𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡    (1)                                                                                    
Where ‘i' and ‘j’ denote India and its trading partners respectively ‘t’ denotes time. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑡 is the unit value of exports of each product ‘p’ from country ‘i' to country ‘j’ in time 
‘t’; Distij is the geographical distance between country ‘i’ and country ‘j’ in kilometer; and 𝑌𝑗𝑡 is 
the country j’s GDP in time ‘t’. TRIPSjpt indicate the implementation of TRIPS by the importing 
country ‘j’ on year ‘t’. RTAijt represents the regional trade agreement between the host country 
‘i' and the destination country ‘j’ in time ‘t’. We expect a positive sign for this coefficient. 
Tariffjpt signifies the tariff imposed by the country ‘j’ on the import product ‘p’ from country ‘i’ 
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in time ‘t’. Healthjt and Langij indicate the health expenditure (expressed as percentage GDP of 
importing countries' health expenditure) of the partner country ‘j’ in time ‘t’ and sharing a 
common English language between the country and the importing countries respectively. 𝛿𝑡 and 
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 are time dummy and an error term respectively. FDIjt is inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the IPI from the country ‘j’ at time ‘t’. 
 We use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the gravity model. Since the dependent 
and explanatory variables are in logarithms, the estimated coefficients correspond to elasticities. 
Distance effects are estimated as a parameter in the gravity equation. We define 𝛽1  as the 
“distance effect,” the negative of the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance. There is 
time subscript for the dummy variables for RTAs. TRIPS and RTAs are the two explanatory 
variables of central interest. 
4.3.3 Empirical Results 
 Table 1 reports the results. Column (1), (4) and (7) of Table 1 present the benchmark 
gravity model using distance and GDP as explanatory variables. As expected, the distance 
variable has an estimated coefficient whose sign is negative and highly significant. The distance 
coefficient on total export is -0.14. The estimated coefficient of distance suggests that 10% 
increase in distance lowers export of pharmaceuticals by about 1.4%. Splitting the total export 
into exports of formulations and exports of bulk drugs, most of the distance effect is negative and 
significant at 1 percent level. Its coefficient on the formulations export is -0.31 and that of bulk 
export is -0.19 which are slightly higher that of the total exports. The GDP effect has almost 
similar pattern across the exports of formulations and bulk drugs with the distance effect. The 
GDP effect is also higher in case of formulations exports: the GDP effect for total export, 
formulations and bulk drugs are 0.17, 0.26 and 0.25 respectively. The estimated coefficients for 
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GDPs are positive and highly significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of GDP suggests 
that 10% in increase in partners’ GDP will increase a 1.7% in total exports. It suggests that trade 
is sharply decreasing with distance and increasing in destination GDP. Both the distance and 
GDP effect is higher in case of formulations exports than that of bulk drugs exports. Thus, India 
exports less to countries that are farther apart and increases its exports with economically larger 
countries. 
Drawing all of the elements together, columns (2), (5) and (8) present results for an 
extended gravity model that includes a range of TRIPS, RTAs, tariff, health expenditure, 
language and year dummies, in addition to the standard elements of GDP and distance. The fit of 
this extended model is higher than that of the benchmark model that contained just GDP and 
distance. The R
2
 for the total trade column has increased slightly from 0.02 to 0.03, for 
formulations export, it increases from 0.05 to 0.09, and for bulk drugs export, from 0.04 to 0.04. 
The coefficient of distance effect is now only significant on formulations export and insignificant 
for both total exports and bulk drug exports. The GDP coefficients are highly positive and 
significant for all the three variables.  
The dummy variable for TRIPS as whether a trading partner implements TRIPS in time ‘t’ 
or not is negative and has a highly significant effect on the total exports. The coefficient of 
TRIPS on the total exports is -0.55. It confirms our prediction that India has shifted its exports to 
unregulated markets from regulated markets. Bouet (2015) had also found the same negative 
effect of TRIPS on the Indian pharmaceutical exports. He propounded a possible reason that the 
compliance of TRIPS led to increase sanitary and pharmaceutical regulations in importing 
countries, which in turn increase costs to the detriment of foreign exporters. As India’s 
comparative advantage lies on generic production and cost-based strategies, it reduces the 
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comparative advantage of India. Another possible reason could be rising US concerns over 
regulatory standards, quality parameters, etc. and increase global competition in regulated 
markets. For instance, according to Ind-Ra estimates, the impacts on Indian pharmaceutical 
exports due to import alert by US FDA over issues of data documentation, testing facilities and 
procedures at Indian facilities, banned facilities contributed around 7%-8% of the total exports to 
the US and around 2% of the overall 2013 pharmaceutical exports from India. In other words, 
estimated impact on the existing exports revenue would be around 7-8% of the total exports to 
the US, and around 2% of the overall 2013 pharmaceutical exports from India.  
From column (5) and (8), the impact of TRIPS implementation on the formulations is 
higher than that on export of bulk drugs. The coefficient of TRIPS on the exports of formulations 
is -0.69 which is higher than that of bulk drugs (i.e. -0.38) by 0.31. A possible reason could be 
that though India exports most of its generic drugs in the regulated markets, India has started 
shifting its formulations exports from highly regulated market to unregulated markets. Its impact 
on bulk drugs exports is not quite surprising as India mainly exports bulk drugs to developing 
and underdeveloped countries. The coefficient of RTA has positive and highly significant effect 
on total exports. The RTA coefficient on the total exports is 0.23. Further, its impacts on exports 
of formulations and bulk drugs are 0.28 and 0.29 respectively. It indicates that the RTA has also 
contributed to the growing bulk drugs exports of India at a very significant rate. Here, it is worth 
mentioning that most of the India’s RTA signed countries are developing and underdeveloped 
countries. Thus, TRIPS implementation adversely affects developing countries like India by 
lowering its comparative advantage and by reducing revenues due to stronger quality control 
measures imposed by USFDA. As a result of it, competition among developing economies 
increases in the regulated generic markets which directly affect India and in search of new 
markets, she has to shift its trade pattern from regulated markets to unregulated markets where 
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lesser patent protection prevails. Improving productivity, quality of its drugs and institutions 
becomes mandatory in order to sustain its dominant role in regulated generic market. In short, 
pharmaceutical industry in developing countries faces a difficult time as a result of TRIPS 
implementation. It again proves that RTAs is helpful in promoting bilateral trade between 
countries. It increases Indian pharmaceutical exports within partner countries. 
Surprisingly, tariff has positive and significant effect on total exports. The coefficient of 
tariff on the total exports is 0.03. It is also positive and significant on both formulations exports 
and bulk drugs exports. The tariff coefficient is higher on the bulk drug exports (i.e. 0.02) than 
that of the formulations export (i.e. 0.01). This result is against the conventional theory. One 
possible explanation is that Most Favored Nation (MNF) tariffs are not the best measure of tariff 
restrictions and transaction costs that restricts Indian pharmaceutical exports. India, being a 
WTO member, apply MNF tariffs to other member countries, as well as, she can also apply 
preferential rates with a limited number of countries, which are lower than MNF tariffs (Bouet, 
2015). We run OLS regression on Indian pharmaceutical exports to OECD countries (excluding 
Japan and Korea) to double check our arguments.  
Table 2 gives the result. The tariff coefficient is negative and significant for total exports. 
It implies that 10% increase in tariff rates renders to 0.8% decrease of Indian pharmaceutical 
exports to OECD countries. However, the tariff coefficient for formulations is positive and 
significant, and negative and insignificant for bulk drugs exports. This positive effect for 
formulations exports might be due to the fact that, in the wake of developed countries’ increasing 
dependence on Indian pharmaceutical exports, though developed countries applied higher tariff 
rates to formulations drugs, they could not resist importing Indian generic drugs due to cheap and 
quality drugs. In other words, the domestic demand for Indian made drugs is very high in the 
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host country. The same goes to the developing and underdeveloped countries. Most of these 
countries are imposing higher tariff rates on Indian pharmaceutical exports, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, they still import a large quantity of Indian pharmaceuticals, suggesting that 
they are trying to adopt import substitution policy for drugs and pharmaceuticals but had failed.  
The coefficient of health care expenditure is negative and insignificant except for bulk 
drug exports. The healthcare expenditure effect on bulk drug exports is negative and significant 
at 1 percent level. It indicates that 10% increase in healthcare expenditure (expressed as % GDP 
of importing countries' health expenditure) of the importing countries will reduce 0.04% bulk 
drug exports from India. It is quite opposite to what was expected. One of the possible 
explanations of this result could be that as health expenditure increases, rich countries usually 
implement more restrictive sanitary and pharmaceutical regulations increasing transactions costs 
for exporters making them less competitive (Bouet, 2015). The FDI coefficient is positive and 
highly significant for all three variables. Its coefficient for formulations (0.24) is higher than that 
of total exports (0.1) and bulk drugs exports (0.1). The dummy variable for English as a common 
language is positive and has a highly significant effect on the total exports (0.39) and 
formulations (1.1). It suggests that countries sharing common language export more. But the 
coefficient of English dummy is positive but insignificant for bulk drug exports. Sharing   
English language in common once again favors more on formulations exports than on bulk drug 
exports. 
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Table 1: Impact of TRIPS and RTA on Indian Pharmaceutical Exports: 
Regressing Log Exports/Log Formulations/Log Bulk Drugs on TRIPS, RTA and Other Variables Using Gravity Model. 
 
   Log Export (Total)        Log Export (Formulations)   Log Export (Bulk Drugs) 
 
OLS  OLS  FE     OLS  OLS  FE      OLS  OLS  FE   
(1)  (2)  (3)      (4)  (5)  (6)        (7)  (8)  (9)  
Distanceij -0.137  -0.029   -    -0.308  -0.314   -      -0.187 -0.057    - 
  (7.21)*** (0.96)   -     (10.27)*** (6.36)*** -      (8.54)*** (1.64)    - 
GDPjt  0.168  0.214  -0.016     0.257  0.324  0.283       0.250 0.302  -0.076 
  (28.47)*** (18.66)*** (0.17)     (28.30)*** (18.43)*** (2.12)**       (35.07)*** (22.21)*** (0.72) 
TRIPSjt    -0.550  0.046   -0.692  -0.137   -0.376  -0.070   
    (10.85)*** (0.45)   (9.19)*** (0.90)   (6.22)*** (0.57)           
RTAijt    0.226  0.003   0.282  -0.338    0.288  0.124  
    (3.60)***  (0.03)   (2.65)*** (2.52)**   (4.16)*** (1.34) 
Tariffjpt    0.031  0.029   0.011  0.019    0.017  -0.013  
    (8.75)*** (6.44)***  (2.29)**  (2.41)**   (3.58)*** (2.32)**              
Health Expjt   -0.006  0.031   -0.010  0.055    -0.037  0.005   
    (0.76)  (1.18)   (0.84)  (1.50)   (4.29)*** (0.15) 
Ln_FDIjt   0.097   0.053   0.241  0.149    0.094  0.084  
    (2.22)**  (1.19)   (3.80)***  (2.35)**   (1.79)*   (1.58)      
Languagej   0.388       -   1.101       -   0.049       -  
    (9.70)***              -   (17.81)***                  -   (1.05)       - 
Year Effects NO  YES  YES      NO   YES  YES       NO  YES  YES 
Constant    8.054  4.683   10.714      8.405  2.558  2.296       5.670 2.201  11.336  
  (42.43)*** (4.72)***      (5.12)***    (27.75)*** (1.77)*  (0.77)       (25.86)*** (1.83)*  (4.57)*** 
 
N  45905  25357   25357       17319     8921  8921       28586             16436  16436 
RMSE  2.5485  2.5795           2.4173      2.3783         2.3475 2.3876  2.3821  
R2  0.0174  0.0252           0.0058      0.0456  0.0879  0.0243      .0413  0.0381  0.0070 
Adjusted R2 0.0173  0.0243           0.0011      0.0455 0.0853  0.0112       0.0412  0.0367  -0.0001         
 
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% 
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Table 2: Tariffs Effect of Develop Countries on Indian Pharmaceutical Exports: 
Regressing Log Exports/Log Formulations/Log Bulk Drugs on TRIPS, RTA and Other Variables 
Using Baseline Gravity Model. 
 
   Log Export (Total)          Log Export (Formulations)  Log Export (Bulks Drugs) 
  OLS  FE   OLS  FE  OLS   FE 
   (1)   (2)   (3)  (4)    (5)                 (6)  
Distanceij -0.507     -            -1.063     -  -0.206     -              
  (1.86)*     -           (2.31)**        -   (0.68)     -           
GDPjt  0.223  -0.854  0.486        -0.200             0.307  -0.969                 
  (8.21)*** (3.28)***         (11.57)***   (0.47)  (9.50)***           (3.28)***          
TRIPSjt  -1.406           -0.435  -0.186  -0.040  -0.691  0.408                
  (2.32)**        (3.35)***         (0.22)      (0.05)  (0.82)  (0.48)              
Tariffjpt  -0.077   -0.106               0.144  0.030  -0.009  -0.021  
  (2.44)**  (3.35)***         (2.02)**  (0.38)  (0.29)  (0.65)  
Health Expjt 0.147   0.133                 0.179  0.031  0.116             0.125  
  (7.01)*** (2.22)**            (5.29)***    (0.31)  (4.85)***       (1.88)*  
Ln_FDIjit -0.068   0.099                 0.039  0.212  -0.027  0.137  
  (1.11)  (1.26)  (0.42)  (1.71)*  (0.37)         (1.50)  
Languagej 0.599      -                    1.290     -  0.230                -  
  (6.23)***     -          (8.47)***        -  (2.08)**                -  
Year Effects        YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Constant           11.141  32.276              6.099  13.840  4.463             33.332  
  (4.17)*** (5.22)***         (1.43)    (1.37)  (1.43)              (4.72)***  
 
N        9356              9356                 3100               3100             6256         6256          
RMSE  2.6431             -  2.4796         -  2.4324         - 
R2  0.0565           0.0087              0.1662           0.0247            0.0658        0.0094     
Adjusted R2 0.0541          0.0040              0.1597            0.0107            0.0622        0.0025      
 
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 
1% 
 
4. Conclusions 
With the increase in globalization process, the world pharmaceutical industry has also 
changed. The role of developing countries in the pharmaceutical GVCs becomes more 
momentous due to this growing interconnectedness of production processes across countries. On 
the other hand, the developed countries have lost its market shares in the world pharmaceutical 
industry. One of the main reasons behind this losing of market share is due to the rapid growth of 
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the major developing countries in the world pharmaceutical sector, particularly China and India. 
The IPI has already been affected in its business by other developing countries such as China. A 
concern has been growing about the replacement of sales lost to TRIPS compliance. In order to 
make up this loss, the leading domestic firms have increased their exports of generic drugs to the 
regulated markets. R&D agreements and M&A activities have also been undertaken significantly. 
Indian domestic firms must strengthen their industrial capabilities over time. This will enable 
them to stay more competitive and able to capture a bigger pie of global pharmaceutical market 
share. This raises the question as to what extent India can move forward in the wake of 
globalization.  
We investigate the determinants of trade in pharmaceutical products using standard 
gravity model. Both the distance and GDP effect is higher in case of formulations exports than 
that of bulk drugs exports, suggesting that India exports less to countries that are farther apart 
and increases its exports with economically larger countries. Interestingly, the coefficient of 
TRIPS is found to be negative. Some of the possible reasons are stated. First, due to TRIPS 
implementation by partner countries, India finds itself to be in a very difficult position to export 
to regulated market due to increase sanitary and pharmaceutical regulations in importing 
countries. Such regulations raise exporting costs thereby impeding pharmaceutical exports. As a 
result of it, India exports more in unregulated markets. It confirms that after implementation of 
TRIPS, India shifts its export market from developed countries to developing and 
underdeveloped countries gradually. Second, TRIPS implementation reduces the comparative 
advantage of India, i.e. generic production and cost-based strategies. The impact of TRIPS 
implementation on the formulations is higher than that on export of bulk drugs. It is believed that 
though India exports most of its generic drugs in the regulated markets, India has shifted its 
formulations exports from highly regulated market to unregulated markets. The coefficient of 
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RTA has positive and highly significant effect on total exports. It indicates that the RTA has also 
contributed to the growing bulk drugs exports of India at a very significant rate. 
Surprisingly, tariff has positive and significant effect on total exports and also on both 
formulations exports and bulk drugs exports, which is against the conventional theory. One 
possible explanation is that Most Favored Nation (MNF) tariffs are not the best measure of tariff 
restrictions and transaction costs that restricts Indian pharmaceutical exports. India, being a 
WTO member, apply MNF tariffs to other member countries, as well as, she can also apply 
preferential rates to selected countries, which are lower than MNF tariffs (Bouet, 2015). To 
double check our arguments, we examine the impact of tariffs on Indian pharmaceutical exports 
to OECD countries (excluding Japan and Korea). The tariff coefficient turns out to be negative 
and significant for total exports and bulk drugs. It confirms the above argument have some 
merits. However, the tariff coefficient for formulations is positive and significant. One possible 
explanation is that even though developed countries applied higher tariff rates to Indian 
formulations drugs, they still import a large quantity of Indian generic drugs due to its cheap and 
high quality drugs. In other words, the domestic demand for Indian made drugs is very high in 
the host country. The same goes to the developing and underdeveloped countries. Most of these 
countries are trying to adopt import substitution policy for drugs and pharmaceuticals but had 
failed. The coefficient of health care expenditure is negative and insignificant except for bulk 
drug exports. Another unexpected result is the negative effect of health care expenditure on 
drugs exports. One of the possible explanation of this result could be, as health expenditure 
increases, rich countries usually implement more restrictive sanitary and pharmaceutical 
regulations increasing transactions costs for exporters making them less competitive (Bouet, 
2014). The FDI coefficient is positive and highly significant for all three variables. The dummy 
variable for English as a common language is positive and has a highly significant effect on 
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pharmaceuticals exports, indicating that sharing   English as a common language increases 
pharmaceutical exports. Thus, widespread regulatory actions by importing countries have 
affected Indian pharmaceutical exports. It indicates that after the success in acquiring a favorable 
share in the regulated markets, India is trying to bolster its market share in the unregulated 
markets. 
With changing political and regulatory environment, TRIPS implementation has made 
developing countries like India shift its pattern of trade from regulated markets to unregulated 
markets, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it adversely affects these countries by lowering 
its comparative advantage and by reducing revenues due to stronger quality control measures 
imposed by USFDA. It necessitates developing countries to improve productivity, efficiencies, 
institutions, etc. for their survival. RTAs promote bilateral trade between countries. It suggests 
that countries at different levels of industrial and technological development may be faced with 
varying economic costs and benefits from stronger IPRs. 
Policy Implications and Recommendations: 
Since developing economies don’t have better technologies and components, they could 
not produce niche and high quality medications. Therefore, they should not protect their 
domestic industries, for international cooperation is necessary to build their industrial capabilities. 
Trade barriers may restrict them to participate in pharmaceuticals GVCs. Thus, a regulatory 
regime, adhering to global regulatory practices, to provide healthcare affordable and accessible is 
necessary in developing country like India. But it should not be at the cost of the industry, as   
stringent regulatory policy with its intended purposes may hinder product launch and lose focus 
in India. For instance, a strict price control measure for essential medicines may lead to 
unexpected fallout of several drugs due to less profitability. The government should find a 
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balancing path with viability and as such, policy measures like insurance and public private 
partnerships could be initiated. 
  
23 
 
References: 
Anderson, J. E. (1979). “A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation”. The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 69, No.1, pp.106-116. 
Anderson, J. E. (2011). "The Gravity Model". Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.133-160. 
Anderson, J.E. and Wincoop, E. van. (2003). Gravity with Gravitas. The American Economic Review, Vol. 
93, No. 1, pp. 170-192. 
Bedi, N., Bedi, P.M.S. & Sooch, B.S. (2013). “Patenting and R&D in Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: Post-
TRIPS Scenario”. Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol. 18, No.18, pp.105-110. 
Bouet, D. (2015). “A study of intellectual property protection policies and innovation in the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry and beyond”. Technovation, Vol. 38, pp. 31–41. 
Chadha, A. (2009). “TRIPs and Patenting Activity: Evidence from the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry”. 
Economic Modelling, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp.499-505. 
Chaudhuri, S. (2007). "Is Product Patent Protection Necessary in Developing Countries for Innovation? 
R&D by Indian Pharmaceutical Companies after TRIPs”. Indian Institute of Management, 
Calcutta, Working Papers Series No. 614/ Sep. 2007. 
Chaudhuri, S. (2011). " Multinationals and Monopolies Pharmaceutical Industry in India after TRIPs”. 
Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, Working Papers Series No. 685/ Nov. 2011. 
Chaudhuri, S., Goldberg, P.K., & Jia, P. (2006). “Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in 
Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India”. The American Economic Review, Vol. 96, 
No. 5, pp.1477-1514. 
Disdier, Anne-Ce´lia and Head, K. (2008). “The Puzzling Persistence of the Distance Effect on Bilateral 
Trade”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 37-48. 
Feenstra, R.C., Markusen, J.A. and Rose, A.K. (1998). “Understanding the Home Market Effect and the 
Gravity Equation: The Role of Differentiating Goods”. NBER Working Paper No. 6804., 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6804. 
Fink, C. (2000). “How Stronger Patent Protection in India Might Affect the Behavior or Transnational 
Pharmaceutical Industries”. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/06/27/000094946_000
60905463269/additional/11. 
Grace, C. (2004). “The Effect of Changing Intellectual Property on Pharmaceutical Industry Prospects in 
India and China: Considerations for Access to Medicines”. 
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/Grace2China.pdf . 
24 
 
Guennif, S. & Ramani Sh. V. (2012). “Explaining divergence in catching-up in pharma between India and 
Brazil using the NSI framework”. Research Policy, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 430-441. 
Hafner, T. and Popp, D. (2011). “China and India as Suppliers of Affordable Medicines to Developing 
Countries”. Working Paper 17249, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17249. 
Hanson, G.H., Lind, N. and Muendler M. (2014). “The Dynamics of Comparative Advantage”. NBER 
Working Paper No. 21753. , http://www.nber.org/papers/w21753 . 
Jha, R. (2007). “Options for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry in the Challenging Environment”. Economic 
and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 39, pp. 3958-3967. 
Kiran, R. and Mishra, S. (2009a). “Changing Pragmatics of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry in the Pre 
and Post TRIPS Period”. International Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 4, 206-220. 
Kyle, M. and McGahan A. (2012). “Investments in Pharmaceuticals Before and After TRIPS ”. The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 94, 1157-1172. 
Lawless, M. (2010). “Deconstructing Gravity: Trade Costs and Extensive and Intensive Margins” . 
Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 43, 1149-1172. 
McCalman, P. (2001). “Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent 
Harmonization”. Journal of International Economics, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp.161-186. 
Melitz, J. (2007). “North, South and Distance in the Gravity Model”. Europena Economic Review, Vol. 51, 
No. 4, pp. 971-991. 
Pöyhönen, P. (1963). “A Tentative Model for the Volume of Trade Between Countries”. 
Weltwirtschafliches Archiv, Bd. 90, pp. 93-99. 
Rose, A. (2004). “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?”. The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 98-114. 
Tinbergen, J. (1962). “Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy.”. 
New York: Twentieth-Century Fund. 
Watal, J. (2000). “Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices and Welfare Losses: Policy Options for India Under the 
WTO TRIPS Agreement”. The World Economy, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp.733-752. 
 
 
25 
 
 
APPENDICES 
A. List of Countries 
1 Afghanistan 
2 Algeria 
3 Angola 
4 Argentina 
5 Australia 
6 Austria 
7 Bangladesh 
8 Belarus 
9 Belgium 
10 Benin 
11 Bhutan 
12 Brazil 
13 Burkina Faso 
14 Cambodia 
15 Cameroon 
16 Canada 
17 Chad 
18 Chile 
19 China 
20 Colombia 
21 Congo, Dem. Rep. 
22 Congo, Rep. 
23 Costa Rica 
24 Cote d'Ivoire 
25 Czech Republic 
26 Denmark 
27 Dominican 
Republic 
28 Ecuador 
29 Egypt, Arab Rep. 
30 Ethiopia (excludes 
Eritrea) 
31 Finland 
32 France 
33 Germany 
34 Ghana 
35 Guatemala 
36 Guinea 
37 Haiti 
38 Hong Kong, China 
39 Hungary 
40 Indonesia 
41 Iran, Islamic Rep. 
42 Ireland 
43 Italy 
44 Jamaica 
45 Japan 
46 Jordan 
47 Kazakhstan 
48 Kenya 
49 Korea, Rep. 
50 Lao PDR 
51 Libya 
52 Malawi 
53 Malaysia 
54 Mali 
55 Malta 
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56 Mauritius 
57 Mexico 
58 Morocco 
59 Mozambique 
60 Myanmar 
61 Nepal 
62 Netherlands 
63 New Zealand 
64 Niger 
65 Nigeria 
66 Pakistan 
67 Paraguay 
68 Peru 
69 Philippines 
70 Poland 
71 Portugal 
72 Romania 
73 Russian Federation 
74 Rwanda 
75 Senegal 
76 Singapore 
77 Slovenia 
78 South Africa 
79 Spain 
80 Sri Lanka 
81 Sweden 
82 Switzerland 
83 Tajikistan 
84 Tanzania 
85 Thailand 
86 Turkey 
87 Turkmenistan 
88 Uganda 
89 Ukraine 
90 United Arab 
Emirates 
91 United Kingdom 
92 United States 
93 Uruguay 
94 Uzbekistan 
95 Venezuela 
96 Vietnam 
97 Yemen 
98 Zambia 
99 Zimbabwe 
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B. List of Free Trade Agreement Countries
1 Bhutan 
2 Cambodia 
3 Indonesia 
4 Japan 
5 Korea, Rep. 
6 Lao PDR 
7 Malaysia 
8 Myanmar 
9 Nepal 
10 Philippines 
11 Singapore 
12 Sri Lanka 
13 Thailand 
14 Vietnam 
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C. List of Preferential Trade Agreement Countries 
1 Afghanistan 
2 Argentina 
3 Brazil 
4 Chile 
5 Paraguay 
6 Uruguay 
 
